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Abstract: This article investigates the motivations behind charitable behavior and 
tries to access the role played by government in influencing its level. Considering 
impure altruistic models on charity, we regress 2010 cross-country charity data (money 
donations, volunteered time and help to strangers) on institutional, demographic and 
economic variables, using SURE, OLS and Fractional Logit estimation procedures. Our 
econometric tests show institutional and demographic variables are even more relevant 
than the so-called crowd-out effect from government expenditure in determining 
charitable behavior. These findings indicate the design of oriented public policy may 
not be enough for the development of a pro-charity ethos.
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Resumo: Esse artigo investiga as motivações por detrás do comportamento caridoso 
e tenta identificar o papel da intervenção governamental em alterar o seu nível. 
Consideramos modelos de caridade de altruísmo impuro e regredimos dados transversais 
de países para o ano de 2010 (doações em dinheiro, trabalho voluntário e ajuda a 
estranhos) utilizando variáveis institucionais, demográficas e econômicas, valendo-nos 
dos métodos SURE, MQO e Fractional Logit. Nossos testes econométricos apontam 
que variáveis institucionais e demográficas são ainda mais relevantes que o crowd-out 
do gasto governamental para a determinação do nível de caridade, indicando que 
o desenho de políticas públicas pode não suficiente para o desenvolvimento de uma 
cultura pró-caridade.
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1 Introduction
There are different definitions of charity in social and economic literature. 
Becker (1974, p. 1083) defines charity as “contributions of time or goods to unrela-
ted persons or to organizations”, emphasizing the anonymity dimension of charity. 
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Other authors as Freeman (1997, p. S140) think in volunteering as a “work perfor-
med without monetary recompense”, which underlines the lack of financial ambi-
tion of individuals, an important but not essential feature of charity, at least directly. 
In a juridical report prepared by the Australian government, the recommended 
definition of charity involves a “not-for-profit entity, that has a dominant purpose(s) 
that are charitable, altruistic and for the public benefit” (SHEPPARD, 2001, p. 5). 
From a more libertarian point of view, Harper (1978, v.1, p. 232) defines “truly cha-
rity” as “assistance given voluntarily and anonymously from the product of one’s 
own labor, or from his property that has been saved”.
Regardless of its definition, charity is not a marginal or residual economic 
activity (as one might think), nor solely an act motivated by religious beliefs or 
tax proposes. In this research paper we will try to decompose the main factors 
behind charity behavior, a sector that in the USA represents nearly 2% of personal 
income (ANDREONI, 2008). For such analysis we will consider The World Giving 
Index 2010, a Charity Aid Foundation (CAF) publication containing cross-country 
data on charity, which will be the dependent variable in our econometric analysis 
testing a wide range of institutional, demographic and economic variables, an in-
novational attempt in the literature.
As we can infer from Table 1, charity may depend on a complex set of factors. 
Rich countries as Spain and Finland present very low levels of giving if compared 
to some developing or even poor countries as Sierra Leone, Guatemala and Mo-
rocco. In the same way, we figure out that former British colonies present a high le-
vel of charity of all kinds, while communist and ex-communist countries of Eastern 
Europe are among the less charitable ones.
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Table 1 - World Giving Index 2010 for selected countries
Country
% of population who … in the 











Australia 70% 38% 64% 57%
USA 60% 39% 65% 55%
Sierra Leone 29% 45% 75% 50%
Guatemala 46% 33% 51% 43%
Morocco 72% 4% 44% 40%
Finland 42% 28% 42% 37%
Brazil 25% 15% 49% 30%
Spain 25% 13% 44% 27%
Hungary 22% 9% 32% 21%
Russia 6% 20% 29% 18%
China 11% 4% 28% 14%
Greece 8% 5% 28% 14%
Source: Tabulated from CAF (THE WORLD GIVING INDEX, 2010).
One of our main goals is to test if governmental interference in economic 
and social life depresses the charitable impulse of individuals. If confirmed our hy-
pothesis, it would mean (for instance) that some welfare state countries are under 
serious risks during economic crisis, since in these times governments are forced to 
cut public expenditure in social areas (such as health and education) which might 
not be compensated by individual charity. This supposed lack of private compen-
sation comes from the fact that charity is a habit, and as a habit pending on social 
networks it cannot be created out of thin air or through government persuasion, 
demanding time and a set of ethical values difficult to impose from above. In addi-
tion, recessions usually lessen household’s income, pointed by the literature as 
another important factor behind charity. So crisis in welfare state countries may 
constitute a mix of concomitant negative determinants to charity: bad institutions 
and diminishing income. With results at hand, we could suggest public policies 
to be implemented by governments in trying to develop private charity and also 
comprehend the institutional limits of its actions. At the same time, our results may 
help fundraising campaigns to improve their outcomes. 
This paper is organized in the following way: we begin with a resume on the 
charity literature, trying to understand the different lines of thought and justifying 
why our approach is unprecedented; then we present the methodology and data 
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used in our econometric tests; and finally we conclude with our estimations and its 
policy implications.
2 Literature Overview
For the sake of a better understanding, we divide literature presentation be-
tween a theoretical analysis and an empirical one, as follows. 
2.1 Theoretical Literature
Especially during the second half of the 20th, economists tried to understand 
what motivates people to support other people or causes through charity.
In early studies, the understanding of charity was restricted to the idea of 
charity as a private way to provide a public good, meaning that people behaved 
altruistically in the sense of giving their money (or time) in order to increment the 
quantity and quality of public goods. Starting from this vision that links charity to 
the public finance, researchers brought the concept of Ricardian Equivalence in an 
attempt to understand donors’ behavior in a rational fashion.  Doing so, Andreoni 
(1989) postulated that investment in public goods through taxation would crowd-
-out private donations in a one-to-one proportion. Thus, the distribution of wealth 
between government and tax payers would not affect the total supply of public 
goods, since rational individuals would reallocate their money previously destined 
to charity to the payment of taxes that would be used to the same end. Stretching 
this reasoning, Warr (1982) suggested that tax policies would only be effective in in-
creasing the provision of public goods if beyond a point where private charity of all 
agents reached zero, inducing a forced transfer of resources from the consumption 
of private goods to the ‘consumption’ of public goods.
Later on, with better understanding of coordination problems in big societies 
formally presented by Olson (1971), charity researchers brought the idea of free-
-riding to their studies, inferring that a greater part of former donors would free-
-ride other people’s donations in larger economies. According to this, per capita 
private donations would converge to zero (ANDREONI, 1988). This model was 
then called the pure altruist model, and can be synthesized by the following maxi-
mization problem:
),(max GxfU ii =
subject to: iii wgx =+  and GGg ii =+ −
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where iU  is the utility function to be maximized, ix  is the consumption of private 
goods, ig  is the private donation to public goods, iw  is the individual income, G  
is the total provision of public goods coming from private donations, while iG−  are 
the aggregate donations expected by individual i ’s contribution.
This model can be sophisticated through the inclusion of forced contribution 
to public goods, i.e. taxation, which alters the budget and public goods’ constraints 
to:
  iiii
wgx τ−=+  and YTGg ii =++ −
where iτ  is the ‘forced donation’ by individual i , T  is aggregate tax revenue by 
the government and Y is the total provision of public goods, paid now with money 
from taxes and donations.
Using a Nash Equilibrium concept it is easy to prove that spontaneous private 
donations would converge to zero as economies become bigger, reassuring the 
necessity of taxation to compensate the free-ride problem. 
However, after observing real data and figuring that charity did not decrease 
with economic growth and complexity (actually it increased), some theories emer-
ged stating (for example) the importance of donations by rich people, sometimes 
encouraged by altruistic motivations as having bigger control over charity institu-
tions and sometimes looking for social visibility and other egoistic feelings.
Despite analyzed through different points of view and nuances by Becker 
(1974) and Andreoni (1990) – and primarily by Bentham during the XVIII-XIX cen-
turies –, these egoistic motivations brought the theory of private demand for goods 
into light, i.e. when economists notice a constant growth in charity, they realize that 
public policy and economic development were not the only causes in influencing 
charity. The so called ‘warm-glow factor’ was then recognized as another variable 
capable of inducing people to behave charitably. The arrival of these ‘inner moti-
vations’ to the charity literature revolutionized research, which thenceforth have 
tried to measure the relative importance of altruism and egoism, testing the so 
called ‘impure altruistic’ models.
The Pure Egoistic model presented in Chart 1 was developed by Becker 
(1974), in which iR  is the total social reputation (which can be ‘purchased’ by 
donations) and ir  is the initial endowment of social reputation, different for each 
individual. In the Impure Altruistic model presented in the same chart, we have a 
stylized version of the mainstream models on charity, in which ig  enters directly 
in the utility function as a normal private good (warm-glow), disassociated of its 
public good function, captured by G  solely.
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Chart 1 – Stylized models of charitable behavior under pure egoism and impure 
altruism
Pure Egoism Impure Altruism
Utility function ),( iii RxfU = ),,( iii gGxfU =
Constraints
Budget iii wgx =+ iii wgx =+
Public Good
iii Rrg =+ GGg ii =+ −
Social iii rwRx +=+ -
Source: Author’s own elaboration.
So, after the turning-point of warm-glow ‘discovery’ a bunch of new issues 
emerged in the literature. Among them we can point out studies on: the decisions 
about time allocation to volunteered work, the role of fundraising institutions, the 
signaling issues, the effect of monetary incentives to donations, the impact of lot-
teries, the effect of donations in kind, among others. All these topics helped social 
scientists to map human behavior, sometimes proving some sociological patterns 
and sometimes demystifying universal truths about human goodness. Their sup-
port to charities’ fundraising campaigns should not be neglected as well.
2.2 Empirical Literature
After an overview of the literature about charity, we now proceed with a qui-
ck glance on its main empirical findings, and the new insights and concerns they 
brought to surface.
Firstly, we address the issue of estimating the real (if there is one) crowding 
out effect of the public expenditure on charity, testing the pure altruistic models’ 
hypothesis of a one-to-one compensation or the alternative hypothesis of a below-
-one elasticity. This check was made in literature by computing the price elasticity 
of individual donations, considering the subsidies given to donations through tax 
rebates as the donation price.
Tests indicated different effects depending on the time horizon of analysis: 
in the short-run substitution is well above -1 but in the long run this relationship 
lays below one (in absolute terms), although some authors found a permanent 
179Análise Econômica, Porto Alegre, ano 35, n. 68, p. 173-197, set. 2017.
relationship between -1.1 and -1.3, indicating that by cutting taxes government 
could increase the total supply of public goods through private donations (ANDRE-
ONI, 2008). Another important finding is a below 1.0 income elasticity of charity 
(ANDREONI, 2008) implying that giving is a normal good. Although, some au-
thors consider donations as a luxury good, advocating the importance of wealthy 
people’s donation and therefore lobbying for a progressive subsidies system that 
encourage rich people to donate. The empirical support for this policy proposal 
comes from estimations of price elasticity close to 1.5 in the case of subsidies for 
estate giving (ANDREONI, 2008).
In an anthological paper, Duncan (1999) accused the studies on charity of ig-
noring volunteered time as a donation, which could underestimate government’s 
crowd-out effect. The author argues that time and money should be perfect subs-
titutes in a model in which what matters is the value of labour supply. According 
to this model, we would never observe a physician volunteering in a soup kitchen, 
because if the physician is a rational individual it would be more effective to the 
social cause if he worked normally as doctor, earning its usual high wage, and 
then donated even more money/value to the charity (also consuming more private 
goods). So, in equilibrium, individuals would allocate money and time to charity 
in order to equalize their marginal utilities, implying that charities would never be 
capital constrained, i.e. volunteered time would never be in excess because when 
abundant its marginal utility is much lower than donations in cash that could be 
used to buy capital (for instance, machines, furniture, food etc.).
The model proposed by Duncan (summarized in Chart 2) also predicts that 
the value of volunteered time increases the higher the human capital (ceteris pa-
ribus for the income level). This outcome has been proved statistically, although it 
turns unidentifiable if higher donations are due to higher wages (i.e. a price effect) 
or to any other unobservable individual motivation correlated to education and 
that increases donation in quantity (as ‘warm-glow’ factors). Freeman (1997), in 
turn, found a positive effect of education and wages in determining if an individual 
volunteers time or not, but a negative effect on the number of hours supplied (es-
pecially for women) pointing to an opportunity cost hypothesis. Andreoni (2001), 
on the other hand, remembers that maybe the real effect of education on dona-
tions could have been overestimated due to the omission of wealth in those re-
gressions (i.e. an omitted variable bias), since wealth is highly correlated to human 
capital and charitable behavior at the same time.
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Chart 2 – Stylized model of money and time donations under impure altruism
Utility 
function ( )( )iiii gGZlxfU ,,,=
Constraints
Budget ( ) iiiiiiii vwdxgxltw ++=+=−
Public Good ( ) ( )iiu GgZGZ −+=
Time dhoursworkevlt ii ++=
Labels
volunteervi =  leisureli =  ionsmoneydonatdi =
wagewi =
Source: Author’s own elaboration, based on Duncan (1999).
Besides the intuitive idea that governmental expenditure on charities and pu-
blic goods might crowd-out private charity, Andreoni (2001) remembers we should 
not ignore other potential effects of governmental intervention in the charitable 
sector: the signaling that governments provide about charities’ reputation and, on 
the other way round, the adverse incentives it gives to fundraising, since charities 
may be discouraged to start campaigns (by diminishing their efforts) after having 
public money for granted. However, assuming government correctly represents 
voters’ wishes, the crowd-out may be an almost costless transfer from voters’ pre-
ferences to government’s actions, losing the usual negative meaning of the word, 
i.e. the governmental support to charities may be a simple internalization of voters’ 
will to donate to given institutions/causes (ANDREONI, 2008).
In trying to explain why charity had almost stagnated in the United Kingdom 
between 1974-1994, Pharoah and Tanner (1997) proposed three different explana-
tions: a) the religiousness decline; b) the increase in income inequality, shrinking 
the number of donors despite rising the per capita donation, due mainly to richest 
people’s grants; and c) the change in charities’ role, beginning as non-profitable 
amateur institutions and becoming professional companies with strong support 
from governments, which made donors lost confidence on their supposed inde-
pendent purposes (contrasting with Andreoni’s positive signaling hypothesis).
Composing the experimental literature testing impure altruistic models, we 
highlight the study of List et al. (2006) in which the authors investigated the effects 
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of lottery games in boosting fundraising campaigns’ outcome, in addition to tes-
ting the effect of solicitors’ physical attractiveness on donation. The authors found 
through a field experiment in North Carolina that lotteries can attenuate the su-
pposed negative effect of free-riding on the provision of public goods by giving 
private incentives for donation and then increasing the number of people who 
donate. Surprisingly (or not), an increase in solicitors’ beauty brought the same 
quantitative effect of lotteries, especially among potential donors from the male 
sex, confirming the anecdote that ‘People Give to People, Not Causes’ and the role 
played by warm-glow in defining donation attitudes.
Testing another kind of social interaction treated as a ‘warm-glow’ factor, 
Ariely, Bracha and Meier (2009) found that monetary incentives have a dubious 
effect on charity depending on whether donations are exhibited to others or not. 
The authors found that when donations are public displayed, monetary incentives 
(salaries or any kind of reward) can discourage donations, showing that charity has 
a very strong image component since donors prefer not to be seen as ambitious/
opportunists or greedy before society. In the other case, when information is only 
privately available, people react as the strict concept of rationality predicts, incre-
asing their donations if there is any monetary incentive at stake. Another variable 
tested by the authors was the impact of goodness perception about charities and its 
impact on donation. The results show that good causes as the American Red Cross 
are better off in terms of fundraising compared to ‘bad ones’ (on individual and 
social perception, as the National Rifle Association) in both scenarios with public 
and private available information, making evident that ‘good causes’ do have an 
important impact on donations (in opposition to the famous anecdote).
In this same line, Glazer and Konrad (1996) and Freeman (1997) investigated 
other motivations linked to social behavior. Freeman found that the ‘F-Connec-
tions’ (family, friends and firms) play an important role in bringing individuals to 
engage in charitable activities, i.e. when one of the ‘Fs’ asks for voluntary con-
tributions of both time or money people are more prone to help, sometimes due 
to social pressures sometimes due to the positive signaling about the institutions’ 
reputation giving by the ‘Fs’. Glazer and Konrad, in turn, showed that donations of 
money can be useful for signaling social status in a scenario of imperfect informa-
tion. It happens when ‘vain’ people want to exhibit their social status to commons 
by contributing with big amounts of money, by showing that even huge amounts of 
money cannot affect their general standard of living. This nuance is demonstrated 
satirically through the pattern of donations when charities disclose ranges of do-
nation and not an exact amount of money, so for instance, when charities divide 
donations between $100-500, $500-1000 and so on and so forth, there is a huge 
concentration of donations just slightly above the lowest levels ($100 and $500 in 
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this example), showing that public goods’ supply may not be the sole concern of 
donors.
 Considering our brief description of the empirical literature, we find one 
should not ignore human pride and vanity in trying to understand people’s inten-
tions behind any charitable attitude. Moral values and social pressure also were 
shown to be important sources of ‘goodness’. As it would be too pretentious to 
make any inference about human pride/vanity through a cross-country perspec-
tive, this research paper will restrict itself (like it is not as ambitious) to investigate 
the formation of the last factors. In reassuring the importance of such variables in 
shaping the charitable behavior (letting aside pride and vanity), we quote below 
some other symptomatic empirical results:
a) In the USA, almost one-third of money donations were made by non-
itemizer families in 2003 (ACKERMAN; AUTEN, 2006).
b) Usually money donors are also time donors (ANDREONI; GALE; 
SCHOLTZ, 1996; FREEMAN, 1997). 
c) Nearly a half of donors gives money or volunteeres (or both) to religious 
institutions in the USA (SAAD, 2008; ANDREONI, 1996, 2001).
d) Controlling for gender, education and income, being married and having 
children increase the probability of enrolling in volunteering work (FREE-
MAN, 1997).
Summing up, we are questioning ourselves: from where do come these be-
liefs, individual ethics, social rules and (if we can put this way) altruism? We expect 
the economy to answer us partially, while the institutions and the demographics 
could help us to complete the gap.
3 Methodology and Data
This paper investigates the motivations behind charitable behavior and tries 
to access the role played by government in influencing its level. In an ideal World, 
we would prefer to focus charity through a different and stricter perspective, char-
acterized by one of Harper’s requisite for “true economic charity”: the anonymity 
(HARPER, 1978, v. 2, p. 565). This indispensable quality fits with one of the data re-
leased by CAF, namely, the percentage of population who helped a stranger in the 
previous month (ch_stranger from now on). However, this variable is not as precise 
as we would like it to be, since CAF data do not display the quantity donated by 
the charitable people, i.e. was it a tip to a beggar, the donation of a wheelchair 
to a handicapped or three days painting a school he/she had just heard about? 
In the same manner, the other two information released by CAF, the % of people 
who contributed to charity with money and by volunteering time (ch_money and 
ch_time, respectively) are also subject to the same flaw. As none of the data is ideal, 
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we prefer to perform estimations with the three variables. Doing so, we let data to 
say what is important (or not) in determining the level of charity.
Our cross-country approach to charity is new, mainly due to the ab-
sence of a unified survey using the same methodology all around the World. In 
this survey, carried out in 153 countries and covering 95% of World’s population, 
GALLUP interviewed 1,000 over-15 people in each country by a representative 
sample of individuals living in urban centers, except for bigger countries (where 
more than 2,000 people were surveyed) and smaller ones (with about 500-1000 
interviews). Surveys were carried out by telephone or face-to-face depending on 
country’s telephone coverage (CHARITY AID FOUNDATION, 2010). As we do 
not have the full database containing all individual interviews, it is impossible to 
perform a microdata analysis. In the meantime, as we do not have a series of these 
charity variables it is also unfeasible to estimate a panel. Moreover, as we also 
want to test the effect of institutional variables (that do not change over time, like 
religion, law/economic system and so on) the cross-section analysis is the only and 
the best alternative.
Notwithstanding, we acknowledge the conceptual problems in generalizing 
individual attitudes using aggregation, by ignoring individual idiosyncrasies and 
motivations. We also recognize the problems of cross-country approaches as ana-
lyzed by Pande and Udry (2005), in forgetting countries’ specificities and the en-
dogenous process involving institutions. A good example of it is the difference in 
tax rebate legislations among countries, very difficult to compare (let alone to com-
pute in numeric terms) in a wide cross-country regression. Meanwhile, in defend-
ing our approach, we try hard to mitigate these problems by including in our set of 
explanatory variables a diverse group of demographic, economic and institutional 
factors.
In order to choose our independent variables we considered some stylized 
facts concerning individual and group analysis of charity and extended some impli-
cations of it to a macro perspective.
The population variable may capture the so-called free-ride effect in the provi-
sion of public goods just like the well-known example of big condominiums, where 
it is difficult to enforce or charge someone specifically for the help of others. Low 
population density (density), in its turn, can bring dubious effects: from one side we 
expect sparsely populated countries to compromise day-to-day relations weaken-
ing charity, while from the other the poor coverage of public services (expect in 
large countries such as Russia, Brazil or Mongolia) could motivate stronger social 
networks inside the ‘forgotten areas’ or even from abroad. Another factor to be 
considered is the share of urban population (urban), since rural areas are known 
for stronger links between neighbors and fellow citizens.
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Economic variables like per capita income (income_pc) and its hybrid version 
adjusted by inequality (income_pc_fair) as well as the % of younger and of older 
people (sh_younger and sh_older) will try to capture individual budget and time 
constraints from an aggregated point of view. Regarding inequality and poverty, we 
have an ‘a priori’ guess: whilst poverty accessed by urban_slums may reflect a ma-
terial difficulty in donations, the income_pc_fair could translate a bigger willingness 
(or even coercion) to repair ‘social injustice’ in an unequal society. Besides, we also 
have other momentum variables whose influence rests over both warm-glow and 
the budget constraint, like gdp_growth and unemployment rates, whose economet-
ric results will be explored further along Chapter 4.
In behalf of testing the crowd-out effect through a cross-country approach 
we must understand first why it is unprecedented in the literature. Duncan (1999) 
tried something similar, testing the crowd-out effect of government expenditure 
through microdata estimations for donations of time and money in the USA using 
household government expenditures in each state of the federation. As the au-
thor points out, household government expenditure may not capture properly the 
government supply of public goods and, even if it did, sometimes a greater part of 
these expenses could not be complemented or substituted by household donations 
(as bureaucracy, for example). Besides, and in defense of our approach once more, 
we take account of another argument against Duncan’s attempt which is the small 
variance in public expenditure across US states if compared to our cross-country 
dataset. In trying to override the issue of the substitutability of public goods, we 
consider the sum of public expenditure in education and health as a percentage 
of the GDP (govt), using World Bank data.1 We also constructed a govt_perceived 
index in order to calibrate government expenditure by its perceived level from the 
taxpayer perspective.
As is important to note, charity is in some way a consolidated habit, so we 
expect short run circumstances in economy do not influence charity as much. In 
avoiding short run events to compromise our estimations, we used 5-years aver-
age of economic variables as unemployment, gdp_growth and govt. This approach 
assumes (for example) that the charity level depends more on the persistence in 
government expenditure than on today’s government intervention, being coher-
ent with the habit hypothesis.
We also include variables aiming to explain how the pure warm-glow feel-
ing is conformed, from its more elementary forms as moral and cultural. A first 
group of variables intends to represent a spontaneous impulse towards generous 
attitudes, such as the general level of education (human_capital) and of religiosity 
1 Through this approach we ignore purchasing power effects of different costs in supplying educa-
tional and healthy services in each country, assuming they are proportional to the income level.
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(religious), which can be more specifically evaluated with the help of christian and 
catholic parameters.
From the strictly institutional side we included dummies for countries with a 
common law legal system (common_law)2 and also for former and current com-
munists ones (communist).3 We expect the first present a strong positive effect, as 
British tradition are known for its liberal and charity concerned guidance (for a 
complex discussion on formal jurisdiction see Sheppard (2001), while for historic 
development we recommend Davies (2016)). For the latter we expect the conse-
quences of a long lasting socialist mindset in terms of state-dependency will come 
to surface in the form of a negative effect for all kinds of charity.4
Furthermore, we constructed regional dummy variables in a way not as ar-
bitrary as it might seem. We aggregated some of the thirteen World’s regions used 
my CAF considering some historical and institutional similarities, as an Arab World 
dummy including Northern Africa, Western Asia and Middle East for its religious 
similarities. We also aggregated the North America, Western and Southern Europe 
and Oceania considering that colonization was made mainly by European popula-
tion (as in the USA, Canada and Australia). The Latin America dummy includes 
predominantly catholic regions where besides the European colonizers there was a 
massive contribution of native and slave population to its ethnical mix. Because of 
this aggregation made not only for geographical reasons, we expect that the inclu-
sion of regional controls would diminish the effect of institutional variables.
The explanatory power of institutional and regional variables can be deduct-
ed beforehand if one considers conditional means presented in Chart 3, taking a 
wider sample of 149 countries. For example, while our suggested group of Arab 
countries volunteers 7.8σ below overall average – 12.3 vs 20.2 – they help strang-
ers 4.3σ above – 52.0 vs 46.8. In the same fashion, whether common_law=1 all 
kinds of charity are at least 6σ above average, while for communist=1 they are 
from 2.2σ to 7.8σ below.
2 See Abadie and Gay (2006) for a similar use of this variable in a cross-country approach.
3 The use of an ex-communist dummy in econometric regressions is not new. Kageyama (2009) is 
straightforward in applying the variable in order to explain women happiness disparities across 
European countries.
4 Harper (1978, v.1, p.233-234) is precise in his description of how government intervention can 
compromise social links: “When a taxpayer is forced to contribute to ‘charity’ in spite of his judg-
ment of need, he will increasingly shun the sense of responsibility which is requisite to a spirit of 
compassion; he will lose compassion as he more and more accepts the viewpoint: ‘That is the 
government’s business!’”
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Chart 3 – Conditional means and standard deviations (σ) of charity variables on 
constructed dummies
Mean σ Mean σ Mean σ
Full Sample 46.8% 1.2% 30.6% 1.9% 20.2% 1.0% 149
communist=1 37.3% 1.8% 21.4% 2.0% 18.0% 2.1% 39
common_law=1 54.5% 3.4% 45.5% 6.0% 27.5% 2.8% 15
Eastern Asia 35.7% 3.8% 32.5% 8.5% 18.0% 3.8% 6
Southern Asia 35.7% 3.4% 34.8% 5.5% 22.2% 4.3% 13
Sub-Saharan Africa 49.5% 2.3% 18.4% 1.5% 21.8% 1.7% 36
CEEu+CA 35.5% 1.7% 18.5% 2.0% 17.8% 2.5% 28
Arab 52.0% 2.2% 32.7% 3.9% 12.3% 1.3% 19
NAm+WEu+Oc 49.0% 2.4% 55.0% 4.2% 26.6% 2.1% 23
Latin America 47.9% 2.0% 29.3% 1.9% 21.2% 1.3% 24
ch_money Obsch_stranger ch_time
Source: Author’s own elaboration.
In Appendix A we summarize all variables used in our tests, along with a 
brief methodological description and its source. In Appendix B we display a table 
with summary statistics considering only the 109 countries used for econometric 
regressions.
On some specific econometric questions that may arise, next, we try to clarify 
how we see and deal with issues like inaccuracy in the charity data, collinearity and 
endogeneity.
Concerning the inaccuracy in the dependent variable they are not really a 
problem, or would be impossible to solve anyway. It happens because our charity 
data are constituted of rounded number, for example: 54% instead of 54.2% or 
54.23%. Since these data are rounded in a consistent fashion it does not imply in 
any bias, though does generate a bigger variance of the parameters if compared 
with an (ideal) data full of decimals. Additionally, unless we were the original sour-
ce of the surveys, every external database is in some extent rounded, differing only 
in degree (as are all our non-discrete explanatory variables).
Respect to collinearity in the explanatory variables, it is a common issue ari-
sing from all cross-country studies making use of economic variables since they 
are always in some sort intrinsically correlated, as education and income, income 
growth and unemployment rate, and so on. It means that unless we abstain from 
the use of a full range of controls it is an issue impossible to solve in its plenitude, 
and in spite of generating a bigger variance of the estimators it is not a source of 
bias. In what concerns endogeneity or any potential loop of causality, i.e. the level 
of charity causing one of the explanatory variables, we think charity is still not a 
leading force (unfortunately, in our opinion) for the change in government expen-
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diture or for any institutional rearrangement, nor big enough to influence the level 
of income and education.
At last, we believe in the idea that the lack of a perfect method of estimation 
should not prevent us from carrying out certain tests, since the scientific method 
applied to social sciences (and specifically to forecast individual behavior) is always 
subject to inherent methodological difficulties.
4 Econometric Results
In Table 2 we present a SURE (seemingly unrelated regressions equations) 
model regressing the three charity ratios released by CAF on the same set of inde-
pendent variables. In columns (1) to (3) we include all the economic, institutional 
and demographic variables displayed in Appendix A. These estimated parameters 
are the same as if we had estimated them separately by OLS. In columns (4) to (6) 
we perform the same regression including regional dummies in order to control for 
any unobservable heterogeneity not included in the full set of variables. In columns 
(7) to (9) results came from a two-step estimation procedure: first selecting the in-
dependent variables using a stepwise method (we apply a removal method which 
excludes variables with significance level below 30%, in order to be conservative) 
and then estimating a SURE with these variables, which provides different results if 
compared to an individual OLS estimation. For this last procedure, we keep cou-
pled variables such as govt – govt_perceived and income_pc – income_pc_fair trying 
to avoid further distortions when comparing parameters from full specifications.
As we can notice, theory fits data in some way. In all estimations population 
has a negative and significant (at a 10% significance level at least) effect on charity, 
proving the free-ride effect. Also, while density is statistically irrelevant, the negative 
effect of urban over ch_time may come from the fact that life in cities makes time 
scarcer.
On the income_pc variable, one should be cautious before taking conclu-
sions, since this variable is often strongly correlated to others in the dataset (from 
age profile and education to institutional dummies and religion), which can cap-
ture its effect. At first, it seems we have a striking result that per capita income ex-
plains ch_money only in the stepwise specification (column 8), conflicting with the 
literature. We conjecture that it happens because in predominantly rich societies 
people do not live close to poverty and so do not do well a priori. Notwithstanding, 
when analyzed together with income_pc_fair we find that an increasing level of ine-
quality (measured by GINI index) boost the assistance to strangers. Thus, we can 
state income is relevant for charity as long as there are social injustices to redress.
The age variables had the expected results, reverberating budget and time 
constraints: youngsters (sh_younger) are more prone to volunteer time than to do-
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nate money, while elder people (sh_older) seems to abandon charitable habits in 
all senses but especially on money – a flat income perspective could be the key 
behind this phenomenon.
In the case of unemployment we notice a negative effect over ch_money, whi-
ch may take account of an income effect, i.e. if an individual is short of money (due 
to its unemployment status) it might save resources previously directed to chari-
ty. Although, we check a positive effect on ch_stranger, which we suppose could 
emerge from a kind of identification in which people help others in need/disgrace 
foreseeing theirselves could be in the same situation in the future, and if so would 
like to count on it. This explanation has an analogous in the literature, as Freeman 
(1997) wrote about the mother who works voluntarily for the Cub Scouts believing 
that in the future other mothers would do the same for her children.
Meanwhile, the gdp_growth variable (unprecedented in the charity literatu-
re) showed just a minor positive effect over ch_time. It frustrated our expectations 
of a kind of permanent income effect whether people were expected to donate 
more in cash under “good mood” and optimistic perspectives on the future.
One of our main questions presents a mild convincing result: government 
expenditure in health and education (govt) crowd-out money donations only at a 
15% confidence level. In quantitative terms, we found that if government decrea-
ses public expenditure in 1 p.p. the percentage of people who donates money may 
increase by 1.27-1.32 p.p, considering specifications (2), (5) and (8). So – even 
ignoring all the unknown information about how much donators contributed to 
charity and how much they would do after a forced change in govt – we can presu-
me that when government goes out of people’s lives it encourages charity.
On the other hand, perception of government expenditure (govt_perceived) 
seems to compensate this effect partially, i.e. if people perceive government as ho-
nest, they may complement public contribution, attesting for the positive signaling 
effect of government in boosting charity. Another interesting result concerns the 
negative impact of corruption at the public sector on ch_stranger regressions, i.e. 
the bigger the corruption (hence the smaller govt_perceived) the less people help 
others randomly. We suggest that in societies with high levels of corruption (ceteris 
paribus for all the other variables) people extrapolate their mistrust in government 
to other spheres of society, being afraid their money and effort will be subject to 
embezzlement.
The role of religious is not homogeneous since it appears to reduce ch_time 
while catholic have a positive impact over ch_money, counterbalancing a negative 
effect of christian in general, i.e. Protestantism and other non-Catholic sects seem 
to reduce the aggregate level of money donation. On the other hand, we notice 
that Christianity in general increases the level of ch_time and ch_stranger with res-
pect to other religions.
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Surprisingly, the level of human_capital measured as the expected years of 
schooling is only slightly positive in explaining ch_time in the model with fewer 
variables (column 9). This result goes against the theoretical literature on charity 
in its ‘altruistic branch’ which predicts qualified workers would volunteer less due 
to the high value of their labour (salaries or opportunity cost). In the meantime, it 
favors the empirical literature in which was found a positive effect of education on 
the warm-glow and other egoistic motivations.
The pure institutional dummies- common_law and communist- worked as 
predicted: charity and volunteering are consistently bigger in British tradition 
countries (compared to those under civillaw or order legal systems), while it is 
compromised in former and current communists in its non-monetary forms (ch_ 
stranger and ch_time).
Table 2- Results of SURE models
Source: Author’s own elaboration, based on econometric results using Stata 11.
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As expected, the inclusion of regional controls jeopardized the relevance of 
some institutional variables as religion (catholic and christian) and economic sys-
tem (communist). This outcome was anticipated by the existence of institutional 
clusters as the Islamic religion in Northern Africa and Middle East, Catholicism in 
Latin America and former communist countries in Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia.
Considering results altogether, our estimations are robust to variable selec-
tion and the inclusion of regional variables, supporting economic intuitions. We 
also highlight the explanatory power of regressions, with R-squared lying between 
45% and 63% and being especially high for the regressions on money donations 
(always above 55%). The later outcome confirms our choice of not restricting the 
analysis to the ‘help a stranger’ variable and letting data say what matters for each 
kind of charity. Also, variables are jointly significant as all regressions perform well 
in overall significance tests (p-value of 0.0% in Chi-squared tests).
In Chart 4 we report a further robustness test by comparing significance levels 
from full regressions estimated by SURE, OLS and Fractional Logit (following the 
GLM method proposed by Papke and Wooldridge, 1996) using robust standard 
errors for all of them. In this chart we can compare how similar are the results 
obtained by these different methods with respect to the relevance of the variables. 
Observing the estimations presented in the Appendix C, we notice that all relevant 
variables keep their signs5 differing only in statistical relevance, which makes our 
P-value exercise much more straightforward to test robustness. It is also important 
to stress that SURE estimation will be always more efficient than OLS or Fractional 
Logit models because it considers additional information coming from all kinds of 
charity, so we claim its results are the more accurate.
5 In order to compare parameters in their quantitative sense we need to choose an arbitrary point 
in the case of Fractional Logit. This happens because marginal effects are not uniform in a Lo-
gistic distribution, depending on the values assumed by the explanatory variables. By electing a 
‘fair point’ in the distribution, we took the median observation in our sample (the 109 regressed 
countries) for continuous variables and in the case of dummy variables we took the most frequent 
observation: zero (i.e. non-former/current communist nor common law countries).
Chart 4 – Variables’ significance under different econometric models
SURE OLS FL (Mg) SURE OLS FL (Mg) SURE OLS FL (Mg)
govt - - - - - - - - -
govt_perceived 7,7% - 7,4% 0,0% 0,2% 0,3% - - -
income_pc 3,0% 1,2% 0,5% - - - - - -
income_pc_fair 4,3% 1,3% 0,6% - - - - - -
urban_slums - - - - 9,6% 9,7% - - -
unemployment 4,8% - - 5,0% 3,1% 1,4% - - -
gdp_growth - - 7,9% - - - 7,6% 5,3% 3,5%
sh_younger - - - - - - 7,7% 6,3% 3,0%
sh_older 9,0% 9,0% 6,2% 3,3% 7,6% 9,7% 9,1% 8,6% -
population 2,1% 0,6% 0,1% 4,8% 2,0% 0,2% 0,3% 0,0% 0,4%
urban - - - - - - 5,4% 9,5% 4,4%
density - - - - - - - - -
human_capital - - - - - - - - -
religious - - - - - - 0,0% 0,1% 0,0%
christian 2,1% 4,5% 3,4% - - - 0,3% 0,8% 1,0%
catholic - - - 4,7% 5,0% 0,4% - - -
common_law 2,4% 6,4% 3,8% 4,6% 6,8% 4,3% 2,0% 2,2% 3,4%
communist 3,1% 7,3% 4,5% - - - 7,2% - 6,3%
Significance level below 10% for different estimation methods
ch_stranger ch_money ch_time
Source: Author’s own elaboration, based on econometric results using Stata 11.
As we can find, results do not change significantly except from some variables 
that lost their relevance as (for instance) unemployment in the ch_stranger regres-
sion. In general, we can affirm results are robust, now also with respect to the 
estimation method.
5 Final Considerations
It is important to point out the main policy implications of our results, consi-
dering that charity is a solid habit resulting in a consistent way of supplying social 
protection even in crisis moments.
Corruption exerts a negative effect on charity when considering the percep-
tion of government expenditure in public goods. It implies that government could 
boost private charity if it increases people’s perception of its expenditure, by both 
increasing marketing campaigns or facilitating transparency, i.e. if governments 
were able to increase transparency maybe people would be encouraged to donate 
more to causes that are signaled as good.
At the same time, in some cases, to diminish public expenditure can have a 
substitution effect coming from families’ behavior. At a first sight, it might not look 
interesting for governments to reduce its power over budget and so its political 
influence, but in the long run and mainly when facing a crisis/uncertain scenario 
it would be useful in avoiding or at least mitigating the social (and consequently 
electoral) impact of crisis.
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Then again, our results emphasize the role of institutions in determining cha-
rity behavior. It means that ethics may constraint policies in some way, for example: 
in order to increase charity, Brazil’s government cannot simply impose a common 
law system from the top without changing society, nor Saudi Arabia can motivate 
Catholicism in a major Islamic society, because ultimately institutions are endoge-
nous. So, if institutions are central in determining the strength of social networks, 
they are also in restraining governments’ actions in the short run.
Bearing in mind the literature produced on charity, our results and their policy 
implications, we can indeed affirm charity is not only a multidimensional issue, but 
also that it depends on uncontrolled variables almost impossible to shape by policy 
makers, that become inept. For the time being, some factors such as transparency 
and governmental expenditure (and its counterpart, the tax burden) are in fact sub-
ject to change and show a very positive outcome in encouraging charitable habits.
Normatively speaking, we hope that civil society (and so voters) supports the 
charitable solution against government intervention, helping politicians in solving 
their trade-off. By doing so, they would be motivating goodness and the supply of 
social protection in a more libertarian and spontaneous fashion.
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Appendix A - Summary of Data and its Methodology
Name Variable Description Source
CHARITY
ch_money % of people who donated money
% of urban population, in March 2010 CAFch_time % of people who worked voluntarily
ch_stran-
ger





% of public expendi-
ture on health
% of GDP, average from 2006-2010 World Bankgov_educ % of public expendi-ture on education
govt gov_health+gov_educ
corruption perceived level of corruption
Corruption Perception Index (CPI 2010) in 










per capita income 
(ppp)
Per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
by purchase power parity in 2010.
IMF (WEO)
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ity Per capita income adjusted by inequality -
urban_
slums





unemployment rate % of total labour force unemployed, aver-
age from 2006-2010
IMF (WEO)
% of total labour force unemployed (last 





GDP growth in constant prices, average % 
from 2006-2010. IMF (WEO)
DEMOGRAFIC
sh_
younger % of young people % of population below 14 years old. CIA Factbook
sh_older % of old people % of population above 65 years old.
area land area Total land area in km², in 2010. World Bank
popula-
tion total population Total population in millions, in 2010. IMF (WEO)
urban % of urban popula-tion % of total population living in urban areas World Bank






Expected years of schooling of children, 
in 2010 UNDP
religious % of religious people
share of population identified with: any 





christian % of Christian people
catholic % of Catholic people
common_
law Dummy =1 if has a common law judicial system. Cia Factbook
commu-
nist Dummy =1 if is/was a self-declared Leninist communist country. Fact Monster
REGIONAL
Regional dummies for: North America + Western/Southern Europe + Oceania 
(NAm+WEu+Oc), Latin America, Arab World, Sub-Saharan Africa, Central/Eastern Europe 
+ Central Asia (CEEu+CA), Southern Asia and Eastern Asia.
Source: Author’s own elaboration.
Note: *We considered the percentages of Serbia as being the data from Serbia & Montene-
gro together, which is not a big adaptation considering that the new state of Serbia contained 
more than 90% of the population of the extinct country (according to CIA Factbook).
conclusion.
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Appendix B - Summary Statistics of Regressed Countries
Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
ch_stranger 109 44.0% 12.4% 13.0% 76.0%
ch_money 109 30.3% 20.0% 4.0% 83.0%
ch_time 109 19.5% 10.1% 2.0% 47.0%
govt 109 8.5% 3.1% 3.1% 15.8%
corruption 109 4.35 2.19 2.00 9.30
income_pc 109 15.22k 14.51k 0.39k 81.38k
inequality 109 39.42 9.64 24.70 74.30
urban_slums 109 13.6% 12.0% 0.1% 54.7%
unemployment 109 13.2% 16.2% 0.9% 95.0%
gdp_growth 109 3.7% 2.7% -2.0% 16.9%
sh_younger 109 25.4% 9.8% 13.1% 47.3%
sh_older 109 9.7% 5.7% 2.5% 22.9%
population 109 54.30 175.69 0.32 1341.41
urban 109 60.6% 20.2% 13.6% 97.4%
density 109 0.1244 0.1922 0.0018 1.3125
human_capital 109 13.02 3.04 4.70 20.50
religious 109 91.4% 10.5% 50.2% 99.9%
christian 109 57.3% 37.4% 0.2% 98.1%
catholic 109 30.0% 34.4% 0.0% 96.9%
common_law 109 10.1% - - -
communist 109 27.5% - - -
NAm+WEu+Oc 109 21.1% - - -
Latin America 109 18.3% - - -
Arab World 109 8.3% - - -
Sub-Saharian Africa 109 15.6% - - -
CEEu+CA 109 22.9% - - -
Southern Asia 109 10.1% - - -

























Source: Author’s own elaboration, based on the sample of 109 countries used for econo-
metric regressions.
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Appendix C - Models Comparison
(1) (2) (3) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
VARIABLES ch_stranger ch_money ch_time ch_stranger ch_money ch_time ch_stranger ch_money ch_time
govt 0.101 -1.318 -0.494 0.101 -1.318 -0.494 0.098 -1.075 -0.495
(0.576) (0.865) (0.489) (0.735) (0.918) (0.671) (0.697) (0.889) (0.616)
govt_perceived 1.401* 4.210*** 0.632 1.401 4.210*** 0.632 1.454* 3.773*** 0.623
(0.793) (1.191) (0.673) (0.859) (1.332) (0.821) (0.813) (1.275) (0.721)
income_pc 7.712** 2.311 0.795 7.712** 2.311 0.795 7.990*** 1.709 1.011
(3.558) (5.348) (3.021) (3.008) (6.134) (3.581) (2.857) (4.911) (2.995)
income_pc_fair -211.7** 18.66 76.32 -211.7** 18.66 76.32 -219.5*** 13.2 59.0
(104.5) (157.0) (88.69) (83.45) (187.8) (97.29) (79.5) (149.8) (81.5)
urban_slums -0.0251 -0.246 -0.0340 -0.0251 -0.246* -0.0340 -0.025 -0.241* -0.029
(0.100) (0.151) (0.0851) (0.120) (0.146) (0.0770) (0.112) (0.145) (0.074)
unemployment 0.138** -0.205* -0.0526 0.138 -0.205** -0.0526 0.139 -0.274** -0.064
(0.0698) (0.105) (0.0593) (0.103) (0.0936) (0.0779) (0.096) (0.112) (0.072)
gdp_growth 0.702 0.141 0.688* 0.702 0.141 0.688* 0.725* 0.160 0.687**
(0.456) (0.686) (0.388) (0.436) (0.483) (0.351) (0.413) (0.450) (0.325)
sh_younger 0.226 -0.422 0.401* 0.226 -0.422 0.401* 0.228 -0.428 0.430**
(0.268) (0.402) (0.227) (0.270) (0.444) (0.213) (0.250) (0.446) (0.198)
sh_older -0.771* -1.457** -0.653* -0.771* -1.457* -0.653* -0.812* -1.325* -0.609
(0.455) (0.684) (0.386) (0.450) (0.811) (0.376) (0.435) (0.799) (0.379)
population -0.000132** -0.000170** -0.000146*** -0.000132*** -0.000170** -0.000146*** -0.000147*** -0.000205*** -0.000158***
(5.72e-05) (8.60e-05) (4.85e-05) (4.70e-05) (7.16e-05) (3.90e-05) (4.00e-05) (7.00e-05) (5.00e-05)
urban -0.0490 -0.0301 -0.108* -0.0490 -0.0301 -0.108* -0.0513 -0.0329 -0.1230**
(0.0661) (0.0993) (0.0561) (0.0733) (0.111) (0.0642) (0.0686) (0.0996) (0.0611)
density -0.0149 0.102 0.0106 -0.0149 0.102 0.0106 -0.0148 0.0879 0.0204
(0.0496) (0.0745) (0.0421) (0.0426) (0.147) (0.0561) (0.0410) (0.1070) (0.0551)
human_capital 0.00336 -0.00517 0.00739 0.00336 -0.00517 0.00739 0.0036 -0.0054 0.0082
(0.00616) (0.00927) (0.00523) (0.00666) (0.00813) (0.00762) (0.0062) (0.0078) (0.0067)
religious -0.103 0.0986 -0.363*** -0.103 0.0986 -0.363*** -0.101 0.1375 -0.3802***
(0.115) (0.172) (0.0972) (0.103) (0.175) (0.105) (0.100) (0.174) (0.108)
christian 0.0873** -0.0728 0.0947*** 0.0873** -0.0728 0.0947*** 0.0881** -0.0896 0.0930***
(0.0378) (0.0568) (0.0321) (0.0430) (0.0719) (0.0347) (0.0416) (0.0619) (0.0364)
catholic -0.0323 0.113** -0.0268 -0.0323 0.113** -0.0268 -0.0323 0.1254*** -0.0228
(0.0378) (0.0568) (0.0321) (0.0371) (0.0567) (0.0299) (0.0357) (0.0441) (0.0296)
common_law 0.0760** 0.101** 0.0661** 0.0760* 0.101* 0.0661** 0.0780** 0.1039** 0.0563**
(0.0336) (0.0505) (0.0285) (0.0405) (0.0545) (0.0284) (0.0376) (0.0514) (0.0266)
communist -0.0641** -0.0410 -0.0452* -0.0641* -0.0410 -0.0452 -0.0661** -0.0461 -0.0465*
(0.0296) (0.0445) (0.0252) (0.0354) (0.0568) (0.0295) (0.0329) (0.0490) (0.0251)
constant 0.386** 0.501* 0.378** 0.386* 0.501** 0.378**
(0.191) (0.287) (0.162) (0.199) (0.241) (0.178)
Observations 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109
R-squared (♦) 0.507 0.570 0.462 0.507 0.570 0.462 0.500 0.569 0.440
SURE OLS Fractional Logit (marginal effects)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Standard errors in parentheses
(♦) for Fractional Logit we estimate a pseudo R-squared based on the Deviation statistic.
Source: Author’s own elaboration, based on econometric results using Stata 11.
Recebido em: 08/03/2013.
Aceito em: 26/10/2016.
